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This paper deals with the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf and nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen indices of power
and their application to the House of Councilors in Japan. We studied the following three areas.
(1) We analyzed the party power of each party in the Japanese House of Councilors in 1998 using
the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index. Ono and Muto [1] applied the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen
index to the Japanese House to evaluate the party power distribution in the Japanese House of
Councilors during the period between 1989 and 1992. In the election of 1998, the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) could not regain a majority in the House. They lost their dominant position in the
election of 1989. The nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index, which was originffiy developed by Owen
[3] and later improved by Shapley [8], incorporated voter nonsymmetry into the original symmetric
Shapley-Shubik index. This nonsymmetric index takes into account the ideological differences of the
parties. Two different methods, factor analysis and quantification method III, were used to construct
an ideology profile space of the pattern of voting among the parties observed between January and
June of 1998 (before the election of 1998). The data showed that the distribution of $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{s}$ submitted to
the House was very strongly biased. This contradicts a criterion of the index which assumes random
appearance of $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{s}$ . Therefore, we employed Ono and Muto’s method of evaluating the power of each
party without assuming ramdomness of $\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{s}$, to evaluate the current power of each party in the House.
It is often said that small parties which are ideologicffiy located between large parties have strong
power in comparison with the number of seats they have. This was supported by our analysis as well
as by the indices we obtained using quantification method III, which showed that the Liberal Party
$(\mathrm{L}\mathrm{P})$ and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) have a certain power, although they hold only 12 and
13 seats, respectively.
(2) We investigated the power of each party in the Japanese House of Councilors $\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{f}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ the 1998
election, taking into consideration the supporting rate for each party among eligible voters as $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{U}$
as the voting percentage, through the seat function which itself depended on the voting percentage
and supporting rate. This index was named the Voting Shapley-Shubik (VSS) index with seat as a
function of the voting percentage, to distinguish it from the original Shapley-Shubik index without
the seat function. Figure 1 illustrates the VSS index. We also determined the Shapley-Shubik and
Banzhaf indices of each party.
(3) We studied the power of each party in the House of Councilors after 1998 election , taking
into consideration the supporting rate for each party among eligible voters and the percentage as a
variable, with the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index. We demonstrate that the party power of the
LDP decreases as the voting percentage in the election increases.
In Section 2, the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index of Ono and Muto [1] is reviewed. In Section
3, the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index of each party in the House of Councilors was calculated
based on the 76 nonunanimous votes between January and June of 1998. An ideology profile spaces
was constructed by two different methods, factor analysis and quantification method III. Section 4
deals with several symmetric indices of the seat function. In Section 5, we evaluate the power of each
party after the 1998 election talking into account the supporting rate for each party among eligible
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vot $e\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}$ and the voting percentage as a variable,with the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index.
2 Nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen Index
In this section we review the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index presented by Ono and Muto [1]. Let
$N=\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$ be the set of voters in the House of Councilors who vote for or against particular
bilk, and let $v$ : $2^{N}arrow R$ be a characteristic function, where $2^{N}$ is the set of $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ subsets $S\subseteq N$
and $R$ is the set of real numbers. Denote the set of winning coalitions as $W$ and the set of losing
ones as $L$ . Let us suppose that voters join a $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}A\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ one after another and eventually form the
grand coffiition. Then, there exists a unique voter who joins and thereby turns a losing coalition into
a winning one. This voter is cffied a pivot. Each of $n!$ orderings of $n$ voters has a unique pivot.
The Shapley-Shubik index of a voter is the probability of his being a pivot when every ordering is
equally likely. Therefore, the Shapley-Shubik index of a voting game $(N, v)$ is given as the n-vector
$\psi(v)=(\psi_{1}(v), \cdots , \psi_{n}(v))$ $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\wedge\psi_{i}(v)=\sum_{S\in L,S\cup\{i\}\in W}(s!(n-s-1)!/n!)$ for $i=1,$ $\cdots,$ $n$ , where
$s$ is the number of members in $S$ . As shown in the definition, the Shapley-Shubik index assumes
that each ordering of $n$ voters forms with equal probability. However, in the actual political world,
some orderings are more probable than others. For example, consider three voters 1, 2 and 3, who
are a liberalist, a centrist and a conservative, respectively. Because the extreme voters 1 and 3 are
opposed to each other, the ordering 132 is less likely to be formed than 123 or 321, where the ordering
$ijk$ implies that $i$ is the first to join, $j$ is the second to join, and $k$ is the last to join, that is, the
coalition is formed in the order of $i,j,k$ . Owen [3] introduced an ideology profile space to consider
the nonsymmetry of voters. If there is only one ideological axis, for example, a left-right axis, then
the case of the three voters can be depicted in terms of a line as in Figure 2. For each $i=1,2,3,$ $x^{i}$
denotes the position of voter $i$ . The midpoints of the line segments $x^{1}x^{2},x^{1}x^{3}$ and $x^{2}x^{3}$ serve as the
borders which divide the line into four regions, $E_{1},$ $E_{2},$ $E_{3}$ and $E_{4}$ . For any bill in region $E_{1}$ , voter 1
is the closest, voter 2 is the next closest, and voter 3 is the most distant. Thus, the grand $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}A\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$
is formed in the order 123. Similarly in regions $E_{2},$ $E_{3}$ and $E_{4}$ , the orderings are 213, 231 and 321.,
respectively. It should be noted that regions $E_{1}$ and $E_{4}$ are unbounded intervals. This implies that
if bills arise at random along the whole real line, orderings 123 and 321 would appear at an equal
probability of 0.5. In a simple majority case, voter 2 is pivotal in both orderings. Thus, voter 2 has
ffi of the power. In a unanimous case, voter 3 is pivotal in 123 and voter 1 is pivotal in 321. In this
case, voters 1 and 3 have equal power of 0.5 and voter 2 is powerless.
Figure 3 depicts the cas$e$ of three vot $e\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}$ in a two-dimensional space. Each $x^{i}$ denotes the position
of voter $i$ . Since there are three points, there are three perpendicular bisectors which intersect the
midpoint of the lines which connect each pair of points. In Figure 3, the line $l_{ij}-l_{ij}’$ represents the
perpendicular bisector of $x^{i}$ and $x^{j},j=1,2,3,$ $i\neq j$ . For instance, $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}$]$\mathrm{l}\mathrm{s}$ in the sector formed by the
half-lines $Ol_{13}$ and $OI_{12}^{l}$ produce the ordering 312, since for any bin in this region, voter 3 is the
most enthusiastic supporter, voter 1 is the next enthusiastic, and voter 2 is the least enthusiastic.










Figure 2 : The $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}2\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$of three voters on a $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}-\mathrm{d}\dot{\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{I}$ proflle space
312 is produced is $\alpha/2\pi$ where $\alpha$ is the angle formed by the two lines $Ol_{13}$ and $Ol_{12}’$ . For each of the
other regions, we can find which ordering is produced and its probability in a similar manner. The
ordering in each region is given in Figure 3. Therefore, in the simple majority case where the second
voter is always a pivot, the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index is given by $(\alpha/\pi,\beta/\pi,\gamma/\pi)$ . In the
unanimous case, it is given by $((\beta+\gamma)/2\pi, (\alpha+\gamma)/2\pi,$ $(\alpha+\beta)/2\pi)$ , since the last voter is the pivot.
Figure 4 : ShapIey $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ of orderings
Shapley [8] developed an alternative method of finding the nonsymmetric Owen index applied
to the case with $(n-1)$-dimensional space where $n$ is. the number of voters. For a more detailed
explanation, pleace refer to Owen and Shapley [4]. In his method, the voters are also represented as
points in a space. Issues, however, are represented not by points but by vectors passing through the
origin of the space. Consider two voters, $i$ and $j$ , and an issue $A$ . The $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\cdot \mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ of the two voters are
represented by points $x^{i}$ and $x^{j}$ . Drop perpendiculars from $x^{i}$ and $x^{j}$ to $A$ , and denote their foots
by $x^{i}$
’
and $x^{j}’$ , respectively. In this model, voter $i$ prefers $A$ more than $j$ does, or $i$ precedes $j$ with
respect to $A$ , if $||Ox^{i}||’>||Ox^{j}||$
’ where $O$ is the origin of the space and $||Ox^{i}||$
’ or $||Ox^{j}||$’ is the
distance dong the arrow $A$ between $O$ and $x^{i}’$ , or between $O$ and $x^{j}’$ , respectively. In FiguTe 4, for
issue $A$ We have $||Ox^{\prime_{3}}||>-||Ox^{\prime_{1}}||>-||Ox^{2}||’$ , producing the ordering 312. Similarly, the ordering
128
for issue $B$ is 132. If we rotate the arrow around the origin assuming that issues arise at random,
we find for each ordering the sector in which it is produced. For each ordering the proportion of the
corresponding angle to $2\pi$ gives the probability at which the ordering appears. The nonsymmetric
index is obtained by finding a pivotal voter in an arbitrary position. The same indices are obtained
even if the origins are different. The nonsymmetric index produced by this method is often called the
Shapley-Owen index.
3 Application of the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index to the
voting behavior of the Japanese House of Councilors in January-
June, 1998
We evaluated the power of each party in the Japanese House of Councilors in 1998. In the election of
1998, the LDP did not regain a majority of seats in the House. The LDP had held a majority until
the election of 1989. After the election of 1989, they lost the majority, and this produced movement
by many renewal parties such as the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party of Japan. Ono and
Muto [1] analyzed the power of each party in the House during the period 1989-1992. In this study,
we investigated the power of each party in the House during the period of January-June, 1998 by
analyzing the data concerning the ” $\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}/\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}$” voting pattern of the parties in nonunanimous votes.
The number of seats held by each party after the election of 1998 is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Number of Seats in the House of Councilors held by each party before and after the election
of1998
The voting system in the House was formulated as a weighted majority game in which each $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{T}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}$
is represented as a voter, and the number of seats held by each party is represent as its weight. In the
following analysis, we selected the six largest parties as voters in the game to simplify the analysis.
Thus, the weighted majority game in the IIouse before the election of 1998 is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: The weighted majority game in the House of 1998 before the election
The symmetric Shapley-Shubik index and Banzhaf index of each party in the Hous.e. before the
election of 1998 are given in Table 3.
Using the procedures of Rabinowitz and Macdonald [6] and Ono and Muto [1], we constructed
an ideology proffie space by performing factor analysis of the 76 nonunanimous votes that occurred
in the House of Councilors during the period January- June, 1998. Table 4 shows the patterns of
$\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}/\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}$ voting behavior of the parties and the number of times each pattern occurred in the 76
nonunanimous votes. We also constructed an ideology proffie space by quantification method III and
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Table 3: Shapley-Shubik index and Banzhaf index of each party
Index LDP DPJ JCP Komei SDP LP
Shapley-Shubik $.835$ $.033$ $.033$ $.033$ $.033$ $.033$
Banzhaf $.968$ $.031$ $.031$ $.031$ $.031$ $.031$
evaluated the indices of this profile space.
Table 4: Pattern of $\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}$ voting of the 6 parties in the 76 nonunanimous votes during January-June,
1998 (Sangiin Kaigiroku [7])
Type LDP DPJ Komei SDP JCP LP Number
$1$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $50$
$2$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $12$
$3$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $6$
$4$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $2$
$5$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $1$
$6$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$
$\mathrm{Y}$ $1$
$7$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $1$
$8$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $1$
$9$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $1$
$10$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{N}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ $1$
Indices of the profile space constructed using factor analysis
Factor analysis showed that the first main factor accounted for 41.011 percent of the variance in
tihe 76 votes, and that the second factor accounted for 34.354 percent of the variance.
Table 5: Position of each party in the ideology profile space constructed using factor analysis
Party 1st factor 2nd factor 3rd factor 4th factor 5th factor
LDP $0.58120$ $1.08979$ $-0.21761$ $0.52755$ $1.92172$
DPJ $0.24418$ $-1.04659$ $-1.71312$ $-0.27420$ $-0.04130$
JCP $-2.02265$ $0.26989$ $0.26500$ $0.03890$ $0.02193$
Komei $0.34389$ $-0.76896$ $0.76362$ $1.59576$ $-0.57231$
SDP $0.54723$ $1.21513$ $-0.05561$ $-0.54636$ $-1.44536$
LP $0.30615$ $-0.75921$ $1.11962$ $-1.34165$ $0.51532$
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Table 6: Direction of each type of issue in the ideology profile space constructed using factor analysis
Therefore, the first two factors accounted for 75.365 percent of the variance. Tables 5 and 6 show
the position of each party and the direction of each type of issue, respectively, in the profile space.
Figure 5 shows the two-dimensional profile space constructed using factor analysis.
Figure 5: Two-dimensional profiIe space constructed by factor analysis
Figure 5 shows that the observed issues are not uniformly distributed. The nonuniformity of
issues is intrinsic to our study because bills are mainly submitted by a cabinet, in which most of the
members belong to the governing party. The nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index assumes randomness
of the $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{s}$ . The results of the factor analysis do not meet this assumption. Therefore, we employed
the method of Ono and Muto [1] to calculate the nonsymmetric index using only the data. Thus, the
obtained index shows only the power distribution during January-June, 1998, and does not predict
future voting behavior. We need to find a pivotal party for each type of issue in the two-dimensional
case. For all types of issues, the LDP is the pivot. For example, the order of type 5 is $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}arrow \mathrm{L}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$
$arrow \mathrm{K}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{i}arrow \mathrm{L}\mathrm{P}arrow \mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{J}arrow \mathrm{J}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{P}$ , and the LDP is the pivot. Thus, the index for LDP is $76/76=1$ .
The indices of the other five parties are $0$ . The in.dices for the.one-dimensional case are also noted inTable 7.
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Table 7: Nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index of each party in the ideology proffie space construct $e\mathrm{d}$
by factor analysis
Indices of the profile space constructed using quantification method III
Factor analysis assumes that the distribution of the data is normal, while quantification method
III assumes categorical data. Thus, we can make a proffie space in which the parties and issues are
represented by points. The position of each party and the position of each issue in the ideology proffie
space constructed using quantification method III are given in Tables 8 and 9, respectively.
Table 8: Position of each party in the ideology profile space constructed using quantification method
III
Party 1st axis 2nd axis 3rd axis 4th axis 5th axis
LDP $-0.29048$ $-1.00258$ $-0.19608$ $0.51956$ $1.41022$
DPJ $-0.01951$ $1.05822$ $-1.85980$ $-0.43518$ $-0.05965$
JCP $12.5135$ $-2.44468$ $-0.95954$ $-0.11216$ $0.03835$
Komei $0.15059$ $0.84133$ $0.64291$ $1.67177$ $-0.60648$
SDP $-0.29535$ $-1.12619$ $0.00666$ $-0.52647$ $-1.36737$
LP $0.16825$ $0.83024$ $1.29852$ $-1.31924$ $0.58238$
Table 9: Position of each issue in the ideology profile space constructed using quantification method
III
Typ$e$ 1st axis 2nd axis 3rd axis 4th axis 5th axis
$1$ $-0.12057$ $0.37251$ $-0.05989$ $-0.18909$ $-0.15178$
$2$ $-0.61635$ $-3.29855$ $-0.40515$ $-0.03650$ $0.40341$
$3$ $-0.14045$ $-0.35422$ $2.83500$ $0.91206$ $0.08829$
$4$ $-0.23922$ $-0.17760$ $-2.10654$ $3.24510$ $-2.93087$
$5$ $-0.22993$ $-0.18619$ $-1.08076$ $-4.64814$ $2.66485$
$6$ $5.15380$ $-1.79860$ $1.06695$ $0.49285$ $0.21502$
$7$ $-0.11180$ $0.92656$ $-2.94767$ $6.17927$ $4.67340$
$8$ $-0.42458$ $-1.10589$ $-4.14991$ $-1.55556$ $-0.10174$
$9$ $0.00466$ $1.33816$ $-0.17908$ $1.15299$ $6.24620$
$10$ $6.74016$ $0.22088$ $-1.37359$ $-0.51410$ $-0.21094$
.
As with factor analysis, we can obtain the index of each party from the proffie space using
quantification method III. In the two-dimensiond case, the LDP is pivotal for Types 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9
and 10; the SDP is pivotal for Types 3 and 5; and the LP is pivotal for Type 4. Thus, the index is
$(50+12+1+1+1+1+1)/76=0.882$ for the LDP; $(6+2+1)/76=0.118$ for the SDP. Table 10 gives
the non-symmetric Shapley-Owen index of each party for the one-dimensional and two-dimensional
cases. The indices obtained using quantification method III are more realistic than those obtained
using factor analysis. The index values of each party show that the LDP has alarge amount of power,
even though they do not hold a majority of seats in the House of Councilors.
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Figure 6 : Two-dimensional profile space constructed by quantification method III
Table 10: Nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index of each party in the $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{d}\dot{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{y}$profile space constructed
by quantification method III
Dimension LDP DPJ JCP Komei SDP LP
$1$ $0.961$ $0$ $0$ $0$ $0.039$ $0$
$2$ $0.882$ $0$ $0$ $0$ $0.118$ $0$
4 Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices taking into consideration
the supporting rate for each party and the voting. percentage as
a variable
The number of seats held by each party is determined by the results of the election, which depend
on the voting percentage, i.e., the percentage of eligible voters who vote in the election. We consider
the number of seats as a function, and combine the Shapley-Shubik index of a party with the voting
percentage and supporting rate for that party. Table 11 shows the number of seats held by the top 6
parties after the election and the voting percenta.g$\mathrm{e}$ in the elections of 1989, 1992, 1995 and 1998 of
the House of Councilors. In the House, fifty percent of the members are up for election every three
years.
In Table 11, the SDPJ (Social Democratic Party of Japan) of 1989 and 1992 and the SDP of
1995 and 1998, are different parties. However, ffi of the members of the SDP had been members
of the SDPJ. The Rengo and the Minsha disappeared before the election of 1995, and almost all of
the members of these two parties joined the new DPJ party. By regression analysis of the number
of seats, where the independent variable is the number of seats held by a particular party after an
election and the dependent variable is the voting percentage in the 4 elections, only the Komei had
a high $R^{2}=0.921$ . The $R^{2}$ of the other parties was at most 0.559, which indicates that the number
of seats held by of each party cannot be estimated by the voting percentage. Thus, we arbitrarily
made the seat function, $\phi_{i}(x),i=1,$ $\cdots,6$ of the number of seats held by party after an $i$ as folows,
where $x$ is the voting percentage in the election of members of the House. It is said in Japan that at
higher voting percentages, the number of seats held by the LDP after an election decreases, and the
number of seats held by the DPJ increases. The numbers in parentheses in Table 11 correspond to
the number of seats held by each party after the election as calculated from the seat function,$\phi_{i}(x)$ .
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Table 11: Number of seats held by each party after the election and the voting percentage in the
$\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}^{\backslash }r\mathrm{t}_{}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ of 1989. 1992. 1995 and 1998
Table 12: The seat function $\phi_{i}(x)$
The number of seats held by each party after an election when the voting percentage is 40, 50,
60, or 70 percent, as calculated by the seat function $\phi$ , is given in Table 13. Tables 14 and 15 give
the Voting-Shapley-Shubik index and the Voting-Banzhaf index, respectively, of each party when the
voting percentage varies between 40 and 70 percent. The indices suggest that as the voting percentage
increases, the LDP loses power but would stin have the largest amount of power among the parties.
Table 13: Number of seats held by each party after the election according to the seat function $\phi_{i}(x)$
Voting percentage (%) LDP DPJ JCP Komei SDP LP
$40$ $114$ $41$ $15$ $23$ $17$ $12$
$50$ $110$ $45$ $18$ $23$ $16$ $13$
$60$ $106$ $49$ $21$ $23$ $14$ $13$
$70$ $102$ $53$ $24$ $23$ $12$ $14$
Table 14: Voting Shapley-Shubik indices using the seat function $\phi_{i}(x)$
Voting percentage (%) LDP DPJ JCP Komei SDP LP
$40$ $0.800$ $0.0500$ $0.0500$ $0.0500$ $0.0500$ $0$
$50$ $0.767$ $0.0667$ $0.0667$ $0.0667$ $0.0167$ $0.0167$
$60$ $0.767$ $0.0667$ $0.0667$ $0.0667$ $0.0167$ $0.0167$
$70$ $0.533$ $0.133$ $0.0833$ $0.0833$ $0.0833$ $0.0833$
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Table 15: Voting Banzhaf indices using the seat function $\phi_{i}(x)$
Voting percentage (%) LDP DPJ JCP Komei SDP LP
$40$ $0.938$ $0.0625$ $0.0625$ $0.0625$ $0.0625$ $0$
$50$ $0.906$ $0.0938$ $0.0938$ $0.0938$ $0.0313$ $0.0313$
$60$ $0.906$ $0.0938$ $0.0938$ $0.0938$ $0.0313$ $0.0313$
$70$ $0.688$ $0.188$ $0.125$ $0.125$ $0.125$ $0.125$
As the next step, we considered both the voting percentage and the supporting rate for each party,
i.e., the percentage of eligible voters who support a particular party, and made the seat function
dependent on these two factors. The supporting rates for each party in 1998 are given in Graph 1.
There are, however, voters who support a party but don’t vote. We assume that they comprise 20.3
percent of ffi eligible voters. We also assume that 40 percent of all voters support a party and vote
for that party. This implies that the lowest voting percentage is 40 percent and the highest is 79.7
percent (see Graph 2). The JCP and Komei have $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{U}$-organized, strong systems of voting among their
members. Therefore, 90 percent of the supporters of the JCP and Komei are assumed to vote. Political
independents comprise 39.7 percent of all voters. Their voting behavior is important for ffi parties.
We assumed that the political independents voted for the respective parties at the rates indicated in
Graph 3; these data were obtained from a public opinion $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}$ conducted by Kyoudoutuusinsya on
July 15, 1998.
Graph 1 Supponng rates for each pany in 1998
uvope $e$ . vmng $\mathrm{r}.\mathrm{a}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{I}\Pi$ an $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}-$ $\mathrm{c}*\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ : YoIlng $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{v}l\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$or $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$
independents In $1_{\vee}^{\mathrm{C}}$
Therefore, when the voting percentage is $x$ and the supporting rate is given by the graphs, the
number of seats, $\phi_{1}^{J}(x)$ , held by the LDP after the election of 1998 can be determined by the equation,
$\phi_{1}’(x)=252((15.3/x)+(10.7/100)(x-40)/40)$ , where 15.$3/x$ represents the percentage of voters who
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support the LDP in the voting percentage $x;(10.7/100)(x-40)/x$ represents the percentage of voters
who don’t support the LDP but vote for the LDP in the voting percentage $x$ ; and 252 represents the
total number of seats in the House. Similarly, the number of seats held by the DPJ after the election,
$\phi_{2}’(x)$ , is given by $\phi_{2}’(x)=252((6.8/x)+(29.3/100)(x-40/x))$ , and for the JCP, Komei, SDP and
$\mathrm{L}\mathrm{P}$, it is given by $\phi_{3}’(x)=252((5.8/x)+(20/100)(x-40/x)),\phi_{4}’(x)--252((6.8/x)+(10/100)(x-$
$40/x)),\phi_{5}’(x)=252((3.3/x)+(8.1/100)(x-40/x)),\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\phi_{6}’(x)=252((2/x)+(8.3/100)(x-40/x))$ ,
respectively. The number of seats held by each party after the 1998 election as calculated by these
formulas, is given in Table 16, and the Voting Shapley-Shubik ind$e\mathrm{x}$ and the Voting Banzhaf index
of each party are given in Tables 17 and 18, respectively. We can see that as the voting percentage
increases, the power of the DPJ increases and the power of the LDP decreases. The results of this
analysis indicate that if the voting percentage is 70 percent, alll 6 parties after the election would have
approximately the same amount of power.
.
Table 16: Number of seats held by each party after the 1998 election according to the seat function
$\phi_{i}^{J}(x)$
Voting percentage (%) LDP DPJ JCP Komei SDP LP
$40$ $96$ $43$ $36$ $43$ $21$ $13$
$50$ $83$ $49$ $39$ $39$ $21$ $14$
$60$ $73$ $53$ $41$ $37$ $21$ $15$
$70$ $67$ $56$ $42$ $35$ $21$ $16$
Table 17: Voting Shapley-Shubik indices using the seat function $\phi_{i}’(x)$ , at various voting percentages
Voting percentage (%) LDP DPJ JCP Komei SDP LP
$40$ $0.533$ $0.133$ $0.133$ $0.133$ $0.0333$ $0.0333$
$50$ $0.433$ $0.2$ $0.15$ $0.15$ $0.0333$ $0.0333$
$60$ $0.350$ $0.2$ $0.2$ $0.133$ $0.0833$ $0.0333$
$70$ $0.333$ $0.25$ $0.167$ $0.133$ $0.1$ $0.0667$
Table 18: Voting Banzhaf indices using the seat function $\phi_{i}’(x)$ , at various voting percentages
Voting percentage (%) LDP DPJ JCP Komei SDP LP
$40$ $0.813$ $0.188$ $0.188$ $0.188$ $0.0625$ $0.0625$
$50$ $0.688$ $0.313$ $0.25$ $0.25$ $0.0625$ $0.0625$
$60$ $0.594$ $0.344$ $0.344$ $0.25$ $0.156$ $0.0625$
$70$ $0.5$ $0.438$ $0.313$ $0.25$ $0.188$ $0.125$
5 Nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index taking into consideration
the supporting rate for each party at various voting percentage
In this section, using the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index and the seat functions, $\phi_{i}(x)$ , and $\phi_{i}’(x)$ ,
we analyze the power of each party. For the index, we use the same data on the voting behavior
of the parties and the same ideology profile spaces constructed by factor analysis and quantification
method III. Note that we use data on the voting behavior among the parties before the election of
1998, and the number of seats held by each party in the after the election of 1998. However, the
derived indices may suggest the future power of each party. The method of calculation is the same
as that in Section 3. Thus, we present only the results of the two-dimensional case in Tables 19-22.
The indices using factor analysis seem to be unrealistic. We can see that the Komei has a certain
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power. This may be the reason $\dot{\mathrm{t}}$hat since January, 1999, the LDP has been exploring the possibility
of making a $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{A}\overline{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ cabinet with the Komei.
Table 19: Nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index of each $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\dot{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{y}$ in the profile
$\mathrm{s}.\mathrm{p}$ace c.onstructed by factoranalysis and the function $\phi_{i}(x),\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}$ various voting percentages
Table 20: Nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index of each party in the profile space constructed by
quantification method III and the function $\phi_{i}(x)$ , at various voting percentages
Table 21: Nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index of each party in the profile space constructed by factor
analysis and the function $\phi_{i}’(x)$ , at various voting percentages
Table 22: Nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index of each party in the profile space constructed by
quantification method III and the function $\phi_{i}’(x)$ , at various voting percentages
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, we mention that when the voting percentage varies and the supporting rates for each
party differ, analysis of power indices may be helpful in estimating the power of each par.ty aft.er an
election, if we can make a reliable seat function.
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